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Colors Like Knives: Embodied
Research and Phenomenotechnique
in Rite of the Butcher
Ben Spatz
Eleven Minutes
Conversations about the epistemology of embodied practice continue una-
bated across the arts and humanities. Recent disputes over the epistemolo-
gical status of musical compositions – and whether these in themselves may
or may not constitute research – revisit and reframe, in a different context,
many of the same issues raised over the past decade in theatre, dance, and
performance studies. Very often the objects of analysis in these discussions
are varieties of the classically conceived artistic ‘work’: a repeatable score,
either well-trained or notated, that remains distinct from any particular
moment of performance. Individual performance events, in contrast, are
still more often celebrated on the grounds that they are too ﬂeeting and
ephemeral to be captured by the documentary mechanisms of academic
research. After more than a decade of Practice as Research, Performance as
Research, Artistic Research, and related concepts and coinages, there is still
little consensus as to the basic methods or terms according to which such
research should be framed, disseminated, and assessed.1
This article offers a mode of analysis in which embodied practice is
taken seriously as a way of knowing. It applies a rigorous epistemological
framework to an 11-minute video document from 2011.2 By analyzing
the research content of that video in technical terms, I attempt to move
the above-cited conversations forward in several ways: ﬁrst, by emphasiz-
ing the validity of embodied research in contrast to less coherent notions of
This essay was originally
developed for the
Performance as Research
Working Group of the
International Federation for
Theatre Research (Warwick,
2014). I am grateful to
Bruce Barton, Maria
Delgado, and two anon-
ymous reviewers for invalu-
able feedback on previous
versions. The ﬁnal stages of
writing were also supported
by the Arts and Humanities
Research Council (AHRC)
Leadership Fellow project
‘Judaica: An Embodied
Laboratory for Song-Action’
[grant reference AH/
N006879/1].
1. For these recent
debates in music, see
John Croft,
‘Composition Is Not
Research’, Tempo,
69.272 (April 2015),
6–11; and responses
by Reeves (pp.
50–59), Pace (pp.
60–70), and Croft (pp.
71–77) in Tempo,
70.275 (January
2016). On the ‘work-
concept’ in music, see
Lydia Goehr, The
Imaginary Museum of
Musical Works: An
Essay in the Philosophy
of Music (Oxford:
Oxford University
Press, 1992). Compare
these debates in music
with those found in
Practice-as-Research in
Performance and
Screen, ed. by Ludivine
Allegue, Simon Jones,
Baz Kershaw, and
Angela Piccini
(Basingstoke: Palgrave
Macmillan, 2009).
2. See Note 18, below.
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‘practice’ or ‘performance’ as research; second, by taking the relative
stability of an audiovisual recording as an essential component in sharing
and evaluating such research; and third, by using a conceptual vocabulary
drawn from social and historical studies of laboratory science to clarify
what exactly constitutes research in embodied practice.3 I do not claim
that the approach offered here is the only way to establish greater preci-
sion in framing and articulating performing arts practices as research.
Rather, I offer this micro-analysis as a modest contribution to a complex,
multidisciplinary debate, in the hope that its particular approach will
prove useful or suggestive to others.
The 11-minute performance in question was presented as part of
Movement Research at Judson Church, a long-standing ‘high visibility,
low-tech forum’ in New York City that ‘supports experiments in perfor-
mance rather than ﬁnished products’.4 This context is important, as
Movement Research is one of the few organizations in the United
States that provides direct and explicit support for embodied research.
Carrying forward the legacy of the Judson Dance Theater, Movement
Research at Judson Church provides what Randy Martin calls a space ‘just
outside the market for spectacle’.5 I want to suggest here not only that
the framework of Movement Research is positioned outside the market
for spectacle, but also that its invocation of ‘research’ pointedly empha-
sizes the epistemic dimension of embodied practice as distinct from its
instrumental value in the creation of artworks. Like Martin, I am inter-
ested in reconsidering ‘what would constitute a unit of meaning’ in live
performance, in part through a shift from ‘representation’ – the circula-
tion of signs in an imagined public sphere – to ‘participation’: the circula-
tion of practices across bodies.6 However, I want to postpone for now the
question of how practices circulate between performers and audience in
the complex whole of a live event in order to focus instead on the iterative
elaboration of new technique through practice. In this article I take the
term ‘research’ in the name Movement Research literally, testing it against
social and historical studies of experimental research in the sciences. In
doing so, I am pursuing a hunch that the methodologies of laboratory
science may be more applicable to embodied research than those of the
humanities or social sciences.
The risks and difﬁculties associated with writing critically about one’s own
practice are of urgent concern for many today who occupy hybrid identities
like ‘artist-scholar’ and ‘practitioner-researcher’. In previous publications, I
have used social epistemology to analyze practices from which I can claim
varying degrees of critical distance.7 Now for the ﬁrst time I apply the same
strategy to a practice of which I am the sole author and practitioner. My
claim is that an 11-minute video can be analyzed as a research document,
a trace or record of concrete discoveries made through embodied prac-
tice. To substantiate this claim, I need to show that a distinction can be
meaningfully drawn between the established knowledge that structures
the documented practice and the new, still-inchoate knowledge that the
practice makes possible. In the terms developed by historian of science
Hans-Jörg Rheinberger, I must trace the boundary that separates the
experimental system of the documented practice from the epistemic objects
that emerge from it. Let me clarify here that, in borrowing terms and
3. In a blog post that
resonates with some of
my discussion here,
Rachel Hann proposes
the concatenated form
‘practice research’ as a
‘move away from the
micro-politics of prac-
tice as/through/
based/led’. The den-
sity of the term ‘prac-
tice research’ is
suggestive, but it takes
us no further in clari-
fying what counts as
practice. Given how
much work has gone
into demonstrating
that language, culture,
science, and everyday
life are all forms of
practice, it is unclear
how the term ‘prac-
tice’ in this context can
still be productive.
Rachel Hann, ‘Practice
Matters: Arguments
for a “Second Wave”
of Practice Research’,
Future Practice
Research, 28 July 2015
<https://futurepracti
ceresearch.org/2015/
07/28/practice-mat
ters-arguments-for-a-
second-wave-of-prac
tice-research/>
[accessed 10 March
2016].
4. ‘Movement Research
at Judson Church’,
Movement Research
<https://movementre
search.org/events/ser
ies/movement-
research-at-judson-
church> [accessed 22
February 2016].
Along with
Massimiliano Balduzzi,
I was an Artist-in-
Residence at
Movement Research
from 2010 to 2012.
5. Randy Martin, Critical
Moves: Dance Studies
in Theory and Politics
(Durham, NC: Duke
University Press,
1998), p. 52. See also
Ramsay Burt, Judson
Dance Theater:
Performative Traces
(New York:
Routledge, 2006).
6. Martin, Critical Moves,
pp. 37, 39.
7. In What a Body Can
Do: Technique as
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concepts from Rheinberger, I am in no way reducing embodied research
to the scientiﬁc method. Rather, it is precisely the historicizing destabili-
zation of science accomplished by critical epistemologists like
Rheinberger that allows us to get beyond a binary division between
science and art. In Rheinberger I ﬁnd a surprisingly precise account of
my own embodied research. This is not because my practice is scientiﬁc
but because both scientiﬁc and embodied research are epistemic endea-
vors. What Rheinberger offers is much more than an account of science: it
is a general account of how new knowledge arises out of existing knowl-
edge, and it is this that I apply here to a speciﬁc example of embodied
research.
My presentation at Movement Research on 21 February 2011
was merely a point along the way in the development of a project
called Rite of the Butcher, neither the ﬁrst nor the ﬁnal incarnation of
that work. Yet I consider that showing to be one of my most
signiﬁcant, precisely because it was a public demonstration of research
rather than a private rehearsal or a public performance. The institu-
tional frame of Movement Research implicitly suggests a set of ques-
tions related to this third type of space. What is the difference
between watching performance and watching research? How should
research presentations be analyzed and assessed? Is a research pre-
sentation primarily a place for sharing results or can it also involve live
experimentation? My own answers to these questions provide the
motivation for this essay. While later versions of Rite of the Butcher
embedded its core research content within a theatrical frame, this
version hews more closely to the notion of ‘pure’ (non-instrumental)
research. To understand those later versions one would have to
examine them as theatrical works, considering aspects of performance
that are manifest in the perception of spectators more than that of the
practitioner, such as visual imagery and narrative. This moment of
public research demonstration invites something different. Below I
will suggest that what is needed is a mode of analysis that combines
or synthesizes aspects of the technical and the phenomenological. But
ﬁrst I begin from a methodological challenge: how can we focus
analytically on the epistemic dimensions of a document of embodied
practice? This is the task for which I enlist Rheinberger’s help.
Embodying the Technical
Hans-Jörg Rheinberger offers a scientiﬁcally, historically, and philosophi-
cally informed analysis of how the sciences produce knowledge through
what he calls their ‘experimental systems’:
Within these complex, tinkered, and hybrid settings of emergence, change,
and obsolescence, scientiﬁc objects continually make their appearance and
eventually recede into the technical, preparative subroutines of an ongoing
experimental manipulation. As a result, there is again a continuous genera-
tion of new phenomena, which need not have anything to do either with
the preceding assumptions or with the presupposed goals of the
Knowledge, Practice as
Research (New York:
Routledge, 2015), I
offer the historically
signiﬁcant work of
Tirumalai
Krishnamacharya,
Konstantin
Stanislavsky, and Jerzy
Grotowski as examples
of pioneering research
in embodied techni-
que. In ‘Citing
Musicality:
Performance
Knowledge in the
Gardzienice Archive’,
Studies in Musical
Theatre, 7.2 (2013),
221–35, I examine a
set of published multi-
media videos as traces
of research while also
drawing on my own
period of apprentice-
ship with Gardzienice.
In ‘Massimiliano
Balduzzi: Research in
Physical Training for
Performers’, Theatre,
Dance and
Performance Training,
5.3 (2014), 270–90, I
analyze a set of video
documents produced
by Balduzzi and myself
as part of our sustained
creative partnership.
These three publica-
tions represent three
points along a spec-
trum of distance
between myself and
the object of study:
historical
(Stanislavsky), partici-
patory-ethnographic
(Gardzienice), and
collaborative
(Balduzzi). The cur-
rent essay takes that
trajectory to its logical
conclusion with an
analysis of my own
solo practice.
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experimenter. They usually begin their lives as recalcitrant ‘noise’, as
boundary phenomena, before they move on stage as ‘signiﬁcant units.’8
Rheinberger’s language is dense and requires some unpacking. At ﬁrst
glance there is a fairly simple relationship between the ‘experimental system’,
which includes the physical laboratory and all of its technology and person-
nel, and the ‘scientiﬁc object’ or ‘epistemic thing’ that emerges from that
system. Yet these are merely speciﬁc instances of two more general, quasi-
philosophical categories: the technical and the epistemic. In some very clear-
cut examples, such as a microscope examining a cell, the boundary between
technical and epistemic can be as simple as that ‘between an organic and an
inorganic entity’, an encounter in which ‘the living entity is wet and soft and
the technological one is dry and hard’. In other cases, however, organic
entities such as cells or model organisms may function as ‘organic tools’ in
biological experiments, so that the technical/epistemic boundary is found
within the ‘wet and soft’ domain of organic matter.9 This boundary then is
not a matter of different substances but of how various substances work in
the context of a given experiment: ‘[t]he difference between experimental
conditions and epistemic things [. . .] is functional rather than structural’.10
The question at hand is whether embodied technique – such as that of
song, movement, and imaginative association – can be understood as setting
sufﬁciently coherent boundary conditions to produce meaningful epistemic
objects. Clearly we should not expect from such technical conditions the
kind of quantitative repeatability uponwhich experimental physics or biology
relies. Instead we should look for what I call a ‘relative reliability’ sufﬁcient to
allow for the development and transmission of embodied technique.11
Specifying relative reliability in this sense would allow us to locate the border
between technical and epistemic within embodied practice itself, indepen-
dent of technological supports, by distinguishing within a given practice
between technique that structures it (the technical) and technique that is
generated by it (the epistemic). We might then look to see whether, as
Rheinberger predicts, the new technique produced by a practice, which at
ﬁrst is fuzzy and unclear, can later be routinized and incorporated into the
technical, thereby advancing the whole experimental system along a parti-
cular epistemic pathway. In Rheinberger’s terms: ‘[t]he epistemic things that
ground the experimental sciences emerge from the deposit of the technical
and its potential for tinkering. Whence it follows that time and again they
lend themselves to becoming reincorporated in that deposit.’12
Rheinberger himself has been asked to reﬂect upon the application of his
epistemological framework to the arts and in particular to the idea of artistic
research. He has responded with genuine interest, recognizing the impor-
tance of repetition in painting and music and suggesting that ‘an artist like
Cézanne, who painted hundreds of apples in his countless later still lifes, must
have been caught in a kind of experimental system’.13 Moreover,
Rheinberger emphasizes the deep engagement with materiality that unites
scientists and artists: ‘the interaction of the experimenter with his or her
material lies at the centre. If one is not immersed in, even overwhelmed by,
the material, there is no creative experimentation.’14 With this in mind, we
can turn to the documented practice mentioned above and try to distinguish
8. Hans-Jörg
Rheinberger, Toward
a History of Epistemic
Things: Synthesizing
Proteins in the Test
Tube (Stanford:
Stanford University
Press, 1997), p. 21. I
ﬁrst encountered
Rheinberger via Karin
Knorr Cetina’s essay
‘Objectual Practice’ in
The Practice Turn in
Contemporary Theory,
ed. by Theodore R.
Schatzki, Karin Knorr
Cetina, and Eike von
Savigny (New York:
Routledge, 2001), pp.
175–88. In Cetina’s
evocative description
of unfolding epistemic
things, I caught my
ﬁrst glimpse of how
social epistemology
can be used to describe
aspects of embodied
practice that are
usually missed by pre-
vailing modes of ana-
lysis in theatre and
performance studies.
9. Hans-Jörg
Rheinberger, An
Epistemology of the
Concrete: Twentieth-
Century Histories of
Life (Durham, NC:
Duke University Press,
2010), p. 224. This
collection of essays
builds upon and
extends the arguments
of the earlier mono-
graph. I call the tech-
nical and the epistemic
quasi-philosophical
categories because for
Rheinberger they are
ﬁrst of all practical and
concrete elements of a
laboratory setup (e.g.
microscope and pro-
tein or model organ-
ism and gene), but
they can also be linked
to philosophical
debates over realism as
I suggest below.
10. Rheinberger, Toward
a History, p. 30.
11. ‘Technique consists of
discoveries about spe-
ciﬁc material possibili-
ties that can be
repeated with some
degree of reliability, so
that what works in one
context may also work
198
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [C
om
pu
tin
g &
 L
ibr
ary
 Se
rv
ice
s, 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of
 H
ud
de
rsf
iel
d]
 at
 01
:01
 18
 A
ug
us
t 2
01
7 
an iterative experimental system that might allow for the production of
speciﬁcally new epistemic things. This system would be composed of layers
of embodied technique, equivalent to the bodily skill of experimental scien-
tists but without the support of technological instruments.15 In addition, we
can attempt to locate this experimental system within a broader context of
related embodied experimentation. For as Rheinberger notes, ‘[e]xperimen-
tal systems don’t come in isolation. As a rule, they are part of broader
landscapes or cultures of experimentation. They form ensembles with a
patchwork structure.’16 If the documented practice is indeed a research
practice, then the landscape of experimentation of which it is part will not
be identical to the landscape of cultural performance in which it appears.
From an epistemological perspective, the important context is not in the
minds of witnesses – for example, other performances to which they might
compare it – but in the ﬂows of technique that structure it and the commu-
nities of knowledge that are invested in these ﬂows.
The documented practice explores an epistemic territory I call song-
action. The epistemic objects it seeks to realize are song-actions. In order
to produce these elements, the practice iteratively enacts an experimental
system comprising a number of technical ﬂows. As with any experimental
system, it is impossible to characterize all the layers of the technical that
undergird its epistemic engagement. The best one can do is to enumerate
those technical structures that are most active and inﬂuential at the point
where something new emerges. Whether I was aware of these structures
at the time is irrelevant to my present analysis, which aims to articulate the
technical structure of the experimental system at work in the documented
practice using a combination of embodied memory and reference to video
and photo documents. A ﬁrst step in this analysis would be to enumerate
the main areas of embodied technique that structure the practice as
follows: physical action, spoken text, song-action, and movement impro-
visation (see Images 1–5). In distinguishing these areas, I am not attempt-
ing to create a divisive typology of technique but rather to articulate the
technical patterns that structure the practice. In another context, words
like ‘action’ and ‘song’ might refer to signiﬁcantly different areas of
technique. The meaning of these terms as I use them here emerges not
only from the discursive context of this article but also in reference to the
cited video. In the documented practice, these areas of technique are
explored separately, for differing lengths of time and with differing levels
of expertise.17 Taken together they gesture toward an epistemic territory
(song-action) that I have been exploring for more than a decade.
The present analysis leaves aside the use of spoken text and pure
movement improvisation in Rite of the Butcher in order to focus on the
embodied technique of action and song-action, for it is in these areas that
I consider the main research outcomes and epistemic objects of this
practice to be found. When we attempt to deﬁne an area of embodied
technique such as ‘action’, ambiguity often arises between historical and
technical frames of reference. Historically, the kind of action I am talking
about can be traced through a lineage of practice from Konstantin
Stanislavsky to Jerzy Grotowski to Massimiliano Balduzzi to me.18 This
does not mean that I claim any particular legacy or authenticity deriving
from those names. Clearly there are many lines of practice that could be
in another.’ Spatz,
What a Body Can Do,
p. 42. Although their
technologies allow for
quantitative repetition
and hence for the
scientiﬁc method, the
artisan intuition of
scientists is far more
similar to that of artists
and embodied practi-
tioners than has
usually been acknowl-
edged. This has been
one of the major
arguments of social
epistemology, sociol-
ogy of scientiﬁc
knowledge, and
science studies.
12. Rheinberger, Toward
a History, p. 141.
13. Hans-Jörg
Rheinberger,
‘Forming and Being
Informed: Hans-Jörg
Rheinberger in con-
versation with Michael
Schwab’, in
Experimental Systems:
Future Knowledge in
Artistic Research, ed.
by Michael Schwab
(Leuven: Leuven
University Press,
2013), pp. 199–220
(p. 216). This volume
is an important prece-
dent for my argument,
full of valuable
insights, although it
does not take the
decisive step of identi-
fying artistic technique
with Rheinberger’s
concept of the techni-
cal. This is likely
because of the domi-
nance of the ‘work’
concept (see Goehr,
Imaginary Museum) in
music and visual arts,
which effectively hides
technical knowledge
behind its artifacts.
Hence Schwab’s inter-
pretation of technique
and the technical is
much narrower than
mine (see p. 10 and p.
207). Witzgall and
others in this volume
also engage with
Rheinberger’s con-
cepts but are rarely
able to apply them
convincingly to con-
temporary art and
music because of their
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charted, using these reference points or others, which might employ the
term ‘action’ differently or not at all. By invoking these names, I am
seeking not to authenticate but to specify my practice. While ‘action’ can
refer to many different kinds of technique, in this context the operative
meaning is that speciﬁed by the sequence of names Stanislavsky–
Grotowski–Balduzzi. If one wanted to apply even greater historical spe-
ciﬁcity, one could refer to particular periods of practice, or – even better –
to documents arising from those periods. But I am more interested here
in technical than historical speciﬁcation. Elsewhere I have deﬁned physical
action in Stanislavsky’s sense as corporeally precise movement that is
‘determined by reference not to a future audience but to the organic
reactions of the actor’. In other words, the physical details of a particular
movement are set because they are ‘expected to provoke a fuller organic
engagement on the part of the actor’.19 Grotowski extended this notion
into a search for organicity within a wide range of physical and vocal
expression. In the work of Massimiliano Balduzzi, these precedents have
led to the development of ‘exercise-actions’ that combine a high degree
of movement precision with a dynamic ﬂexibility designed to support
personal associations and intentionalities. What we have here are a series
of historically and technically linked epistemic objects, all exploring in differ-
ent ways the relationship between externally perceptible movement speciﬁ-
cation (for example, position of the spine and extremities, tempo-rhythms,
opposing forces within the body) and the landscape of imagery and associa-
tion that these evoke in the practitioner.20 The extent to which the move-
ment speciﬁcation and the landscape of association are inseparable is what
deﬁnes the presence of Stanislavsky–Grotowski–Balduzzi actions in the sense
I have described.
Like the brief genealogy of ‘action’ just traced, the approach to
singing in the documented practice has its own technical and historical
context, centering around Grotowski’s increased engagement with folk
and other traditional songs in his later work as well as the post-
Grotowskian practices of the Workcenter of Jerzy Grotowski and
Thomas Richards (Italy) and the Centre for Theatre Practices
Gardzienice (Poland).21 In particular, the documented practice
explores what Thomas Richards has referred to as a ‘spiral’ phenom-
enon in his practice of singing traditional songs from the folk and ritual
traditions of Haiti and other Afro-diasporic cultures.22 A spiral is an
open circle with linear directionality perpendicular to its curve. The
circular form in this case is a short repeating refrain, melodically simple
by the standards of European musicology. The complexity of the
singing process is then found not in extended melodic development
(as in European opera) but rather in a linear process that cuts across
multiple iterations of the refrain. According to Richards, traditional
songs in his practice function ‘through repetition, and the way in
which the vibratory qualities of the song are affecting the doer through
this repetition. The melody stays the same, but the resonance is chan-
ging, the vibratory qualities develop along with the repetition.’23 As
Richards suggests, repetition of this kind structures embodied practice
on multiple scales, from small to large.24 I would argue further that
such repetition should be understood as a literal instantiation of
focus on unique ‘art-
works’ rather than
artistic technique.
14. Rheinberger,
‘Forming and Being
Informed’, p. 199.
15. Andrew Pickering,
more than
Rheinberger, empha-
sizes the embodied
technique possessed by
scientists: ‘the open-
ended dance of agency
that is scientiﬁc prac-
tice becomes effec-
tively frozen at
moments of interactive
stabilization into rela-
tively ﬁxed cultural
choreography, encom-
passing, on the one
side, captures and
framings of material
agency, and, on the
other, regularized,
routinized, standar-
dized, disciplined
human practices’.
Andrew Pickering, The
Mangle of Practice:
Time, Agency, and
Science (Chicago:
University of Chicago
Press, 1995), p. 102;
emphasis in original.
16. Rheinberger,
‘Forming and Being
Informed’, p. 205.
17. See Ben Spatz, Rite of
the Butcher, 21
February 2011,
Movement Research,
New York <http://
urbanresearchtheater.
com/2011/02/21/
rite-of-the-butcher-
desert-version/>. This
is a complete video of
the presentation,
recorded byMovement
Research staff, with
what I consider the
‘minimal density’ of
annotation for a
research document:
title of the work, names
of creators and practi-
tioners, and burnt-in
time code for stable
referencing. The fol-
lowing areas of embo-
died technique are
presented in the video:
silent physical action
(0:00–3:10 and 10:10–
10:40); spoken text
with physical action
(3:10–5:02); song-
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research in Rheinberger’s sense. Thus we should take Richards literally
when he asserts that ‘traditions are research’ and describes the
advancement of such research in terms that closely echo those of
Rheinberger.25
The practice analyzed here is based on precisely this kind of iterative
process, or repetition-with-a-difference, across a number of scales or levels.
On a macro scale, one can analyze the development of song-action across a
variety of practices and contexts. On a middle or ‘meso’ scale, one can
examine the different ways in which song-action is used in different projects
created by the same ensemble or individual. Finally, on a micro scale, one
can examine a particular moment or document of practice to see how an
iterative or cyclical approach produces particular epistemic objects or loca-
tions in epistemic space.26 The macro scale has evident links with social and
cultural history and allows for a broad consideration of how embodied
technique relates to larger-scale movements. The meso scale is roughly that
of the artistic work or project when viewed from an embodied perspective,
not as a written score or script but as an epistemic object that is differentially
realized by multiple performances. While both of these perspectives are
important, I have chosen to focus here on the micro scale of analysis in
order to expose the development of new technique in detail.
Epistemologica
I will now describe and analyze three examples of what Rheinberger
variously calls epistemic objects, epistemic things, epistemata, or
epistemologica.27 In each case I will attempt to trace the boundary between
the repeatable technique that gives the practice its identity and the zone of
unpredictable, emergent differentiation out of which new technique arises.
As further discussed below, I am attempting to combine technical and
phenomenological perspectives in a way that would allow another person
with sufﬁciently similar skills to travel along analogous epistemic pathways
and encounter some of the same epistemic territories and objects.
Seated Martial Dance
The practitioner is seated in a chair with their weight and balance
grounded primarily through that point of contact (see Image 1).28
Some weight may be distributed through the feet, but the legs are held
free to move lightly and quickly. The arms are raised to the sides, out-
stretched and poised (Image 1). The action involves a series of sharp
gestures, initiated in the core of the body and grounded through the seat,
in which the hands come together in front of the body.29 The shape into
which the arms and hands arrive is improvised, but the hands never touch.
The ﬁngers may be open or closed and the gestures may invoke associa-
tions such as cutting, pressing, squeezing, slicing, squashing, slamming, or
joining. Successive impulses pull the hands away from each other and then
forcefully back together. The legs alternatingly open and close as part of
the same whole-body impulse. The effort quality of each movement is
action (50:02–9:24 and
9:55–10:10); move-
ment improvisation
(9:24–9:55). Although
an audiovisual docu-
ment cannot provide a
comprehensive record
of this technique, it
affords access to some
aspects – such as align-
ment of the body and
quality of the voice –
with a level of detail and
stability that cannot be
achieved either through
live encounter or
through the written
word. Without sug-
gesting that the cited
video is in any way
identical to the practice
that took place on that
date, I treat it as an
archival record of parti-
cular repeatable path-
ways in embodied
technique. As in other
ﬁelds, it is not the local
instance of an epistemic
object that carries sig-
niﬁcance as a research
output but its docu-
mented trace. Hence,
the relevant question is
not what the video
document misses but
what it captures.
Additional multimedia
documentation of Rite
of the Butcher can be
found at <www.urban
researchtheater.com>.
18. This lineage has gaps.
Grotowski worked not
with Stanislavsky but
with his students and
Balduzzi worked not
with Grotowski but
with people who had
worked with him. I
have also worked with
many other practi-
tioners who use the
term ‘action’ in tech-
nical ways, some of
whom were inﬂuenced
directly or indirectly
by Grotowski. The
three points
‘Stanislavsky–
Grotowski–Balduzzi’
represent moments in
the development of
the technique of
action that hold parti-
cular resonance for me
insofar as I associate
speciﬁc questions,
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strong and direct, but there may be more or less resistance at the begin-
ning and end of each gesture. The overall rhythm is irregular: whenever a
regular rhythm appears, it is quickly broken so that the arrival of each
successive impulse remains unpredictable. Each impulse has a bouncing
quality, with the tempo-rhythm of the bounce depending on how far the
hands move and the duration of the moments of suspension (when the
hands are extended out) and compression (when the hands are almost
touching). All of this movement in the limbs is initiated from the core of
the body and ﬂows out through the ﬁngertips and back. If the movement
is copied without ﬁnding a deep source of initiation through the core, the
Image 1 Ben Spatz, Rite of the Butcher. Movement Research at Judson Church, 21
February 2011. Seated martial dance. Photo by Ian Douglas.
choices, and develop-
ments with each.
19. See Ben Spatz,
‘Stanislavsky’s
Threshold: Tracking a
Historical Paradigm
Shift in Acting’,
Journal of Dramatic
Theory and Criticism,
29.1 (2014), 81–95
(p. 91) – a revised
version of a section in
What a Body Can Do,
pp. 122–32.
20. On Stanislavsky, see
Spatz, ‘Stanislavsky’s
Threshold’: on
Balduzzi, see
‘Massimiliano
Balduzzi’.
21. On Gardzienice, see
Paul Allain,
Gardzienice: Polish
Theatre in Transition
(London: Harwood
Academic Publishers,
1997); Wlodzimierz
Staniewski and Alison
Hodge, Hidden
Territories: The
Theatre of Gardzienice
(New York:
Routledge, 2004); and
Ben Spatz, ‘Citing
Musicality’. On the
Workcenter, see The
Grotowski Sourcebook,
ed. by Richard
Schechner and Lisa
Wolford (New York:
Routledge, 1997);
‘Re-Reading
Grotowski’, a special
issue of The Drama
Review, 52.2 (2008);
and Kris Salata, The
Unwritten Grotowski:
Theory and Practice of
the Encounter (New
York: Routledge,
2012). To grasp the
inﬂuence of this turn
to traditional song
cultures in contem-
porary theatre practice
it is important also to
consider the New
World Performance
Laboratory, Song of
the Goat Theatre,
Theatre Zar, Farm in
the Cave, and other
companies inﬂuenced
by Grotowski, his
Workcenter, and
Gardzienice. These
practices in turn
should be understood
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arms and shoulders may become sore (this happened when I attempted to
teach this action to a group of professional dancers and performers).
The ‘seated martial dance’ appears from a synthesis of the cheironomia
or gesture technique developed by Gardzienice – inspired by the icono-
graphies of ancient Greece – and the approach to irregular rhythms in
physical action developed by Massimiliano Balduzzi.30 Both of these areas
of technique were once epistemic objects, both in the strong sense as
genuinely new discoveries (when they were created by Gardzienice and
Balduzzi respectively) and in the weaker sense of being new to a speciﬁc
individual (when I trained in them). But by the time of the documented
practice, they had both sedimented in my body to the point of being
technical in Rheinberger’s sense: I no longer experienced them as objects
to discover but instead as tools to work with. However, while I was
consciously aware of how I was wielding Balduzzi’s irregular rhythm in
that moment, I was not aware of the inﬂuence of Gardzienice’s cheirono-
mia. The ‘martial dance’ action had emerged the previous summer during
an improvisational session and at the time I had no sense of any strong
historical precedent. It was not until almost a year later, while re-watching
videos of Gardzienice’s training practice, that I realized with a shock how
my ‘martial dance’ adapted the overall quality of the cheironomia while
jettisoning its speciﬁc gestural vocabulary. Hence what I had taken to be a
relatively pure instance of elaborating new physical technique out of
improvisational practice instead turned out to be an example of how
two different technical ﬂows can come together to produce a new epis-
temic object. In this case, technical pathways that had been ingrained in
my body during my 2003–04 apprenticeship with Gardzienice were
synthesized with what I was doing in 2011 under the inﬂuence of
Balduzzi. Through differential reproduction of the known, something
unknown appeared.31
Erotic Descent through ‘oh pa say’
This epistemic object arose from a very different process, more complex
and personal.32 Unlike many of the song-based practices of the
Workcenter, Gardzienice, and many other post-Grotowskian practi-
tioners, my embodied research from 2005 to 2013 was based on the
invention of original songs or ‘song fragments’ in which simple melodic
and rhythmic elements are combined with nonlexical (nonsense) vocables.
The song fragment ‘oh pa say’ was created during the First Song Cycle
project (2007–09), in which all song fragments were developed through
unmediated accumulation. In that approach, neither melodies nor voc-
ables are written down until long after they have been established and
memorized, a process that tended toward the development of musically
simple song fragments that were richly layered with associative meaning
and bodily memory. The ‘oh pay say’ song fragment is especially simple,
making use of just ﬁve notes in its root melody.33 In contrast, most of the
song fragments used in later versions of Rite of the Butcher were created
during a recorded improvisation session and then modiﬁed and memor-
ized as songs. That process allowed for longer and more complex melodic
in the context of
developments in eth-
nomusicology and the
natural voice move-
ment. See Caroline
Bithell, A Different
Voice, a Different Song
(Oxford: Oxford
University Press,
2014), pp. 55–63.
22. Richards referred to
the temporal develop-
ment of a song as a
‘spiral’ in his plenary
dialogue with Daphne
Brooks at Performance
Studies International
#19 (Stanford
University, 2013). I
have not been able to
locate a reference to
this phenomenon in
his publications in
English, but I consider
it a valuably concrete
evocation of
Richards’s experience
of songs as epistemic
objects. Referring to a
very different musical
idiom, Thomas F.
DeFrantz describes a
similar spiral phenom-
enon: ‘[h]ouse music
also tends to work
with sparingly articu-
lated referents, evoca-
tive lyrical hooks that
are open-ended
enough to repeat over
several minutes with-
out signiﬁcant ela-
boration. In this
expressive space that
values repetition over
change, details of har-
monic and rhythmic
structural shifts matter
greatly. More than
anything, house music
relies upon the move-
ment of the bass to
generate sonic drama.’
Thomas F. DeFrantz,
‘Hip-Hop Habitus
v.2.0’, in Black
Performance Theory,
ed. by Thomas F.
DeFrantz and Anita
Gonzalez (Durham,
NC: Duke University
Press, 2014), pp.
227–42 (p. 233).
23. Thomas Richards,
Heart of Practice:
Within the Workcenter
of Jerzy Grotowski and
Thomas Richards (New
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and vocable lines, while sacriﬁcing the pure embodiment of the practice
through its reliance on digital recording as part of the creative process. In
the documented practice, the simple song fragment ‘oh pa say’ is com-
bined with an extended line of actions to produce a spiral development in
which repeated cycles of the refrain iteratively produce a complex song-
action.
During First Song Cycle, ‘oh pa say’ had been linked to a line of
actions that developed over six or seven minutes, through several stages,
including: an initial invocation, touching and being touched by an
imaginary partner, a free-ﬂowing dance initiated in the spine, and a
ﬁnal ‘descent’ in which a deepening and thickening of vocal resonance
went along with a gradual dropping in pitch and a viscerally sexual
association. In the documented practice, this song-action is compressed
into less than two-and-a-half minutes and cut short at the moment of
greatest associative intensity. This version begins with the practitioner
seated (see Image 2). Linking song and movement through breath, they
initiate a searching gesture of the right arm and hand, which begins
gently but soon becomes more forceful and staccato. The action of the
arm draws the performer to standing and leads them forward into the
space. There is a pause in the song as the searching action of the hand
becomes a caress of the practitioner’s own left shoulder. When the song
begins again, it is more rhythmically regular as well as being pitched
higher and ﬁnding a more delicate quality of resonance. This light,
searching quality in both song and gesture leads the performer diagon-
ally across the space, shifting from left arm to right and culminating in
the touching of the right hand to the empty space above the head. The
song now begins to descend in both pitch and resonance, followed by
Image 2 Ben Spatz, Rite of the Butcher. Movement Research at Judson Church, 21
February 2011. Before the start of song-action ‘oh pa say’. Photo by Ian Douglas.
York: Routledge,
2008), p. 45.
24. Ibid., p. 134.
25. ‘[T]raditions are
research. From gen-
eration to generation
they must advance,
develop, otherwise
they will die.
Knowledge is never
complete. It needs to
advance substantially
otherwise it will des-
cend into mechanical
repetition.’ Richards,
Heart of Practice, p.
52. Compare with
Rheinberger: ‘[T]he
temporal coherence of
an experimental sys-
tem is granted by
recurrence, by repeti-
tion, not by anticipa-
tion and forestalling.
Its future develop-
ment, on the other
hand, if it is not to end
in idling, depends
upon groping and
grasping for differ-
ences. Together, this
adds up to what can be
called differential
reproduction. [. . .]
Reproducing an
experimental system
means keeping alive
the conditions –
objects of inquiry,
instrumentation, crafts
and skills – through
which it remains “pro-
ductive”. All innova-
tion, in the end and in
a very basic sense, is
the result of such
reproduction.’
Rheinberger, Toward
a History, p. 75.
26. Here I add a third
category to Mark
Fleishman’s deﬁnition
of Performance as
Research as ‘a series of
embodied repetitions
in time, on both micro
(bodies, movements,
sounds, improvisa-
tions, moments) and
macro (events, pro-
ductions, projects,
installations) levels, in
search of a series of
differences’.
Fleishman, ‘The
Difference of
Performance as
Research’, Theatre
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the arm. The performer sinks to their knees as the song continues to
descend through several repetitions. Here the song-action is cut short,
interrupted by a short pause and followed quickly by the next song-
action, a sustained and forceful chant with nonlexical vocables: ‘enzoma
isode’.
In the context of my present discussion, the signiﬁcance of this song-
action is not only the combination of song and action but also the
depth and quality of the imaginative associations that color it.
Revealing some aspects of this association, including the sexual content
of one moment, raises an important question about the limits of
transferable technique and therefore of the technical in Rheinberger’s
sense. To what extent can associations themselves, whether imagined
or remembered, be taught or transmitted as technique? The actual
associations I was working with in this moment, such as imagined
visual images or physical sensations, are not transmissible to any
other practitioner and therefore cannot be included in the technique
or technical structure of the practice. On the other hand, more general
sexual associations – such as searching, caressing, touching or being
touched, penetrating or being penetrated – are transmissible to a
degree. Substantial work has been done on the ethical risks arising
from the use of sexual associations in hierarchical (director–actor and
teacher–student) relationships and on the spectacular display of anti-
normative sexuality in performance art. But neither the acting studio
nor the theatrical stage of performance art aims to conduct open-
ended embodied research of the kind described here. When analyzing
an embodied research based in solo practice, the question is less how
personal associations create meaning between working partners or
between performer and audience than what kind of psychophysical or
affective impact they provoke in the practitioner. There remains much
work to do in applying queer and feminist perspectives to embodied
practice and research.34
Wrestling the Angel (Song Fragment ‘Bosay’)
This epistemic object was ﬁrst spontaneously elaborated during the
same early improvisational session mentioned above.35 Although lines
of inﬂuence could probably be traced, I do not recognize it as the clear
result of any particular synthesis of previously sedimented technique.
Like ‘oh pa say’, the song fragment ‘bosay’ is rhythmically and melo-
dically simple, comprising just a few notes and a ‘click’ sound (vocal
percussion). In Rite of the Butcher it has always been combined with a
physical action of embracing or grappling with an invisible partner (see
Image 3). The quality of this imagined contact ranges from intimately
sensual to aggressively combative, increasing in force as the song
repeats. The arms and spine are fully engaged and the action can
grow to include rolls across the ﬂoor (Image 4) as well as standing
movement. The physical precision of this song-action is found in the
continuous translation of irregular impulses across the spine and arms,
as if in response to the movements of the imaginary partner, while the
Research
International, 37.1
(2012), 28–37 (p. 29).
27. For the latter two
terms, see
Rheinberger, Toward
a History, p. 141 and
Epistemology of the
Concrete, p. 233.
28. Spatz, Rite of the
Butcher, 1:24–1:59
(primary version in
silence) and 3:38–4:26
(variation with spoken
text).
29. An anonymous
reviewer of this article
queried my reference
to the ‘core’ of the
body as well as the
notion of ‘sufﬁciently
similar’ skills in the
previous paragraph.
To what extent can
such references be
made precise? I cannot
do more than reiterate
my two main points:
ﬁrst, that embodied
technique can only
ever be relatively reli-
able and that some-
thing like ‘the core of
the body’ functions
either as established
technique or as episte-
mic object in any given
experimental system;
and second, that this
writing is offered
alongside the above-
cited video document,
which provides an
entirely different way
of accessing the prac-
tice and can be used to
clarify or critique what
is written here.
30. On the connection to
Gardzienice, see Spatz,
‘Citing Musicality’, pp.
233–34. On irregular
rhythms in Balduzzi’s
work, see Spatz,
‘Massimiliano
Balduzzi’, pp. 279–82.
31. Gardzienice’s cheiro-
nomia technique has
been further devel-
oped, in varying ways,
by Teatr Chorea
<www.chorea.com.
pl>; by Anna-Helena
McLean <www.moon
fool.com>; and in my
ongoing Judaica pro-
ject. This diversity of
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Image 3 Ben Spatz, Rite of the Butcher. Movement Research at Judson Church, 21
February 2011. Wrestling the angel. Photo by Ian Douglas.
Image 4 Ben Spatz, Rite of the Butcher. Movement Research at Judson Church, 21
February 2011. Movement improvisation. Photo by Ian Douglas.
development suggests
that the research in
Gardzienice uncov-
ered a highly genera-
tive area worthy of
further exploration.
32. Spatz, Rite of the
Butcher, 5:02–7:25.
33. In conventional musi-
cal terms, the melody
is ti sol mi sol ti sol fol-
lowed by a half-step
rise to do la mi la do
la. One could also
transcribe this as ‘B-G-
E-G-B-G / C-A-E-A-
C-A’. The former
notation (tonic sol-fa)
is preferable because it
emphasizes the relative
intervals between
notes rather than the
kind of absolute pitch
speciﬁcation favored
by European musical
notation. Thanks to
Scott McLaughlin for
help with this note.
34. Rosemary Malague
contrasts the abusively
heterosexist pedagogy
of Sanford Meisner
with the explicitly
feminist performance
art of Karen Finley in
An Actress Prepares:
Women and ‘the
Method’ (New York:
Routledge, 2012), pp.
113–14. Erotic asso-
ciations also played an
important role in
Grotowski’s shift from
theatrical production
to ‘art as vehicle’.
After Ryszard Cieslak’s
death, Grotowski
revealed that the
actor’s famous work in
The Constant Prince
was based on ‘a time
of love from his early
youth’ in which ‘sen-
suality’ became a ‘car-
nal prayer’ – see Jerzy
Grotowski, ‘From the
Theatre Company to
Art as Vehicle’, in
Thomas Richards, At
Work with Grotowski
on Physical Actions
(New York:
Routledge, 1995), pp.
115–135 (p. 123). I
wrote about consen-
sual power exchange
as a phenomenon
common to
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song retains its regular
rhythm, producing a
dynamic juxtaposition of
embodied regular and irre-
gular rhythms. The associa-
tion of ‘wrestling’ and the
struggle to move or to
stand cut through the repe-
tition of the action, giving it
linearity, while changes in
pitch and resonance cut
through the refrain of the
song: another spiral. The
practitioner is engaged in a
process of energetic develop-
ment, gradually drawing
more and more of the body
into the physical action
while ﬁghting not to break
the structure of the song.
The result is a complex
engagement – movement,
song, action – or body,
voice, affect – which in its
totality constitutes what I
call song-action.
By the time of the documented presentation at Movement Research,
both song fragments – ‘oh pa say’ and ‘bosay’ – had crossed what
Rheinberger calls the epistemic boundary and been incorporated into
the technical. In other words, as the practitioner I was no longer con-
cerned with the question of how to reproduce the song fragments them-
selves. Similarly, the physical actions could each be trained on their own in
a fairly straightforward way. Thus, what had become interesting at this
point was how the song fragments could be integrated with the physical
actions to provoke a more complex and multifaceted engagement on the
part of the practitioner. The three examples just described can be under-
stood as distinct epistemic objects, which I aimed to share with the
Movement Research audience. But what is the signiﬁcance of these
‘epistemologica’? Even if they are indeed epistemic objects, previously
unknown pathways or possibilities at the edge of known technique, of
what use are they? What can be done with them? I do not wish to make
any strong claim here for the signiﬁcance of these particular examples. On
the contrary, I prefer to assert the bare minimum: they are contributions
to knowledge. Yet even if I do not wish to claim any particular value for
these epistemic objects beyond a minimal epistemic expansion, it seems
worthwhile to consider how this type of object – a small, new technical
element – might be taken up in a larger context, becoming instrumentally
useful to other projects.
As noted above, the kind of embodied research discussed here hews
close to the extreme of ‘pure research’: experiments in embodied
Image 5 Ben Spatz, Rite of the Butcher.
Movement Research at Judson Church, 21
February 2011. Movement improvisation. Photo
by Ian Douglas.
Grotowski’s work,
medieval Christianity,
and BDSM in ‘This
Extraordinary Power:
Authority, Submission,
and Freedom in the
Actor–Director
Relationship’,
Ecumenica, 3.2
(2010), 43–61.
35. Spatz, Rite of the
Butcher, 7:44–9:24.
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technique that have no direct instrumental purpose but which may later
be applied according to a variety of orientations. It therefore cannot be
assessed by any single instrumental criterion. Rather, the main criteria of
assessment are those of research: Is it transmissible? Is it new? What can it
do? Let us consider each of these in turn.
Is It Transmissible?
Above all, new technique must be transmissible to other bodies and
contexts. Otherwise it would hardly deserve to be called technique, for
the technical is exactly that which can be reproduced. The song-actions
described above are transmissible both as distinct epistemic objects and as
signposts indicating a ﬁeld or territory of technique. I often use technical
elements from my previous research, such as Rite of the Butcher, in class-
room teaching and workshops. Most often these elements are smaller and
more atomized than the three epistemic objects described above. Thus I
am more likely to teach the kind of vocal resonance used in ‘oh pa say’ or
the spine-limbs connection found in ‘wrestling the angel’ than the whole
integrated song-action. On the other hand, when I teach someone a
physical action, song fragment, or song-action, what I am really intending
to transmit is less that speciﬁc technical element or object than the general
area of technique in which it is located. The two aspects go together:
training in a speciﬁc song fragment is training in a general approach to
singing; working on a song-action like ‘wrestling the angel’ is a way of
engaging with the technique of song-action. As I continue to develop the
technique of song-action, I expand the territory of technical knowledge
into which I can make pedagogical invitations. In any case, it should be
clear from this discussion that what is documented in the video is not
something unique to myself as a practitioner – however ephemeral that
single moment of practice – but something that can be taught, shared,
and transformed by others.
Is It New?
A second set of questions asks about the relationship between the
documented practice and other practices that may be more or less
distant in time and space. Following this line of inquiry one might
appeal to any number of analytical frameworks in order to make
diachronic and synchronic comparisons between the documented prac-
tice and, for example: other presentations made at Movement Research
that year, especially those in which dancers vocalized; other practical
approaches to ‘action’, as in Action Theater or the technique of
‘actioning’; or other attempts to integrate song, movement, and nar-
rative, as in contemporary opera and musical theatre. Drawing more
ﬁnely grained distinctions, one could compare this particular integra-
tion of song and action with those developed by other post-
Grotowskian practitioners such as those mentioned above. This kind
of comparative analysis, which can be used to determine whether the
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documented technique is substantively new, fall within the conven-
tional range of theatre, dance, and performance studies. In contrast,
answers to the third question lie outside this domain, in the related but
undertheorized domain of embodied research.
What Can It Do?
Rather than comparing existing practices, this question opens onto the
discovery of new pathways for practice. Could the song-action techni-
que documented here be used to resolve any problems currently faced
by opera or musical theatre performers? Could it suggest new compo-
sitional strategies for post-dramatic theatre? Might this technique be
useful to creative arts therapists looking to combine existing therapeu-
tic approaches based in dance and drama? Could it be used to structure
a weekly practice session aimed at physical exercise, mindfulness, com-
munity building, or any combination of these? These are questions of
application, of how basic research can be applied. In addition to such
interdisciplinary questions, there is also a set of highly specialized
questions that extend the documented technique in a focused way
and which have been the basis for my own embodied research since
2011. These relate to the use of song-action with traditional Jewish
songs; the extension of song-action solo practice to duo and trio
dynamics; and yet more subtle rhythmic and muscular integrations
between song, action, and other layers or zones of embodiment.
Both sets of questions – the expansive interdisciplinary kind and
those that increase specialization – are signiﬁcant here because they
cannot be answered through analysis, only through further embodied
research. Their answers are not analytical but empirical. While my own
research in song-action has mostly taken place in enclosed, laboratory
settings with just a handful of practitioners, there is no reason why the
resulting technique could not be adapted for larger groups and more
public contexts. While for me song-action has been simultaneously a
physical, interpersonal, spiritual, and scholarly practice, there is nothing
to stop others from developing it for narrower applications or adapting
it to contexts I could not have foreseen.
What I am describing is not radically new insofar as this is how embo-
died technique has been developed, shared, adapted, transformed, inno-
vated, circulated, discarded, and revisited throughout human history. Yet
rarely has the core impulse to discover new technique been foregrounded
over its instrumental use. Rarely have embodied practitioners acknowl-
edged the dialectical and mutually sustaining relationship between tradi-
tion and innovation, training and research, technical and epistemic. Rarely
has embodied technique in its nascent, open-ended, ‘blue skies’ mode
been distinguished from the speciﬁc aims of the performing, martial,
healing, ritual, and other embodied arts. Nor has a strong theoretical
connection been developed between the epistemic objects we encounter
through embodied practice and those produced by technoscience. Yet the
parallel is clear, for the discoveries that so fascinate Rheinberger lead to
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exactly the same sets of questions. Is it transmissible? Is it new? What can
it do? In science too, the empirical has often been debased in favor of
theory. We now know that technology produces science as much as the
reverse. By the same token, it is time to recognize the extent to which
embodied research underpins all our theories and philosophies of
embodiment.
Writing in the Phenomenotechnical Mode
I attempted in the previous section to write in a voice or mode that would
capture the precision and substance of embodied technique as an instru-
ment not unlike those that ground the technological sciences. I now want
to focus explicitly on this mode and consider how it differs from other,
more established modes of written analysis. Clearly we are not dealing
here with what Francisco Varela and Jonathan Shear call ‘third-person’
methodologies, in which a strict separation between subject and object
produces critical distance.36 That kind of analysis is third-person in that it
accords primacy to the perception of spectators and to the meaning of a
practice as it appears in the public sphere. For this reason, such an analysis
is usually more effective when undertaken by someone other than the
practitioner. Because of my closeness to and implication in the practice
documented practice, it would be difﬁcult and counterintuitive for me to
imagine what the performance could have meant to a spectator. It is not
that I could not think about Rite of the Butcher in terms of the circulation
of signs and symbols, but in doing so I would continually have to ﬁght
against the intensive meanings that the practice generated for me as its
practitioner. Like many artists, I prefer not to speak in such terms about
my own practice. The account given above has more in common with
what Varela and Shear dub ‘ﬁrst-person’ methodologies, but it cannot be
identiﬁed with any of the approaches they describe. In particular, the
approach developed here is importantly distinct from that offered by
phenomenology.
Phillip Zarrilli has championed the use of a phenomenological approach
in analyzing performance practice. In a boxed text that appears in two of
his recent publications, Zarrilli provides a detailed phenomenological
account of a few seconds at the beginning of a 2006 performance of
Beckett’s Ohio Impromptu. Like my account of Rite of the Butcher above,
Zarrilli speaks about a moment of his own public embodied performance
practice, but there are important differences between these two accounts.
Zarrilli chooses to narrate those brief moments in which he enters
onstage, prepares to perform, and utters the ﬁrst line of text.
Furthermore he describes a performance that – like other works by
Beckett and Ota Shogo staged by Zarrilli – is performed in radical stillness
and/or slowness. As a result, Zarrilli’s description emphasizes interior
bodily perception:
My attention shifts to my breath. I follow my in-breath as it slowly drops in
and down to my lower abdomen. Keeping my primary attention on my in-
36. Francisco Varela and
Jonathan Shear, ‘First-
Person Accounts:
What, Why, How?’, in
The View from Within:
First-Person
Approaches to the Study
of Consciousness, ed. by
Francisco Varela and
Jonathan Shear
(Thorverton: Imprint
Academic, 1999), pp.
1–15; also available as
Journal of
Consciousness Studies,
6.2–3 (1999), 1–14.
My thanks to Tomoyo
Kawano for providing
me with this reference.
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breath and out-breath, I open my auditory awareness to [another perfor-
mer] about three feet to my left.37
In keeping with the phenomenological tradition of Maurice Merleau-
Ponty, Zarrilli’s emphasis is on his own perception and experience.
His aim is to help the reader understand ‘what it is like’ for him in
that moment. To accomplish this, he necessarily leaves out an analysis
of the layers of embodied technique that make the narrated moment
possible. Thus one does not learn from Zarrilli’s account what makes
his in-breath at the start of Ohio Impromptu different from an ordin-
ary, everyday in-breath. The practitioner’s background in Indian mar-
tial arts, as well as taiji, yoga, and other areas of technique, which is
the focus of the rest of the books, is necessarily excluded from the
phenomenological account. Precisely because they have been mas-
tered and sedimented to the point of unconscious embodiment,
these layers of technique cannot be articulated in the phenomenolo-
gical mode.
Zarrilli’s use of phenomenology is developed with great insight by
Deborah Middleton and Franc Chamberlain in an essay that argues for
the value of Varela and Shear’s ﬁrst-person methodologies in the context
of performance and performer training (as well as spiritual practice).
Citing the same passage, Middleton and Chamberlain point to the tech-
nical expertise at work in Zarrilli’s practice by comparing it with an
account given by Don Hanlon Johnson of an experience in which he
awakes to bodily presence. ‘Johnson seems to be describing an early
moment in his awareness training,’ they note, ‘Zarrilli a much later
one.’38 Indeed, one can attempt to read phenomenological accounts
technically by asking what layers of embodied knowledge and habit had
to have been incorporated in order to make that particular experience
possible.39 But the approach taken here is distinct from those articulated
by Varela and Shear, Zarrilli, and Middleton and Chamberlain insofar as I
am not particularly concerned with consciousness, experience, or ‘what it
is like’ to engage in a particular moment of specialized practice. As
Middleton and Chamberlain suggest, focusing on lived experience
demands ‘a shift away from externally-oriented object-consciousness’
and ‘from research which makes truth-claims for consensual reality’.40
In contrast, my goal here is to offer an account that is ﬁrmly grounded in
the experience of the practitioner while nevertheless making qualiﬁed
claims on consensual reality. I have taken Rheinberger’s social epistemol-
ogy as my model because it describes an experimental context in which
the privileging of the researcher’s perspective goes hand in hand with such
claims.
My account of ‘epistemologica’ moves between ﬁrst- and third-person
pronouns. To name this particular mode of analysis and articulation I
borrow a term from Rheinberger, who takes it from Gaston Bachelard:
phenomenotechnique. A phenomenotechnical account is one that thor-
oughly analyzes the technical in order to trace the contours of its border
with the epistemic. Phenomenotechnique describes both the technical
and the epistemic in terms of the line or boundary where they come
together. It is more than an account of the technical, the merely known,
37. Phillip B. Zarrilli,
‘Performing Reader in
Beckett’s Ohio
Impromptu’, in
Psychophysical Acting:
An Intercultural
Approach After
Stanislavski (New
York: Routledge,
2009), pp. 43–44,
reprinted in Acting:
Psychophysical
Phenomenon and
Process, ed. by Phillip
B. Zarrilli, Jerri
Daboo, and Rebecca
Loukes (Basingstoke:
Palgrave Macmillan,
2013), pp. 20–21.
38. Deborah Middleton
and Franc Chamberlain,
‘Entering the Heart of
Experience: First Person
Accounts in
Performance and
Spirituality’,
Performance and
Spirituality, 1.3 (2012),
95–112 (p. 105).
39. This is in part what
Sarah Ahmed does in
her queer rereading of
Merleau-Ponty inQueer
Phenomenology:
Orientations, Objects,
Others (Durham, NC:
Duke University Press,
2006). But even this
important work does
not go so far as to offer a
technical analysis of the
embodied technique
that underpins classical
phenomenology. The
problem is that deeply
sedimented embodied
technique cannot be
accessed through phe-
nomenological
approaches. Its exclu-
sion or ‘bracketing’ is a
fundamental part of the
phenomenological
reduction.
40. Middleton and
Chamberlain,
‘Entering the Heart of
Experience’, p. 108.
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the sedimented premise or tool, but also more than a mere evocation of
the unknown. According to Rheinberger (and Bachelard), this is the kind
of account that best allows us to understand scientiﬁc research, which
most often unfolds at the point where technological instruments and
epistemic objects make contact. ‘Instruments stand at the heart of th[e]
epistemic ensemble in modern science’, writes Rheinberger. ‘On the one
hand the instrument embodies an already acquired knowledge; on the
other, it helps produce the object as technophenomenon.’41 In embodied
research, the instrument is technical but not technological: it is the known
technique that structures embodied practice. What is produced by this
technique is also embodied, but it is not yet technical: an epistemic object,
new technique in-the-making. A phenomenotechnical account describes
both sides of this equation, articulating a precise research edge. Hence
‘[p]henomenotechnique extends phenomenology’.42 Without a thorough
explication of the technique that structures practice – even if such explica-
tion can never be comprehensive – ﬁrst-person descriptions of experience
and perception remain incomplete, ungrounded, unspeciﬁed. To describe
an epistemic object, it is necessary to begin from the experimental system
that produces it.43
A phenomenotechnical account uses the language of technique to
point toward what is yet unknown. It begins from technical language.
I therefore call for a return to the language of technique, which is so
often elided outside the studio or rehearsal room. When performers (or
athletes) are asked to describe what they do on record, often they
speak in general terms and avoid the kind of technical analysis that they
would use in a context of practical work. Perhaps in deference to the
gap between practical expertise and general interest, highly skilled
practitioners tend to assume that most people will not care about the
technical details that structure their practice.44 But a serious encounter
between critical discourse and embodied knowledge cannot take place
until the language of technique makes a substantial return. This
encounter, which ﬁnds a strong analogy in the engagement of social
epistemologists with scientiﬁc discourse, must assume with
Rheinberger that the technical language of the practitioner gets at
the ‘aboutness’ of the work in a way that critical and spectatorial
analysis cannot.45 Yet most technical accounts do not go as far as the
phenomenotechnical mode. Especially where the focus is pedagogy,
technical accounts tend to emphasize the known over the unknown,
stopping short of describing epistemic objects in their unknown emer-
gence. Such accounts may even mislead the reader by suggesting an
illusory completeness that conceals the provisional and processual nat-
ure of knowledge.46
What we need is a mode of analysis that uses thick technical
description to point to unfolding epistemic objects: a mode that
deﬁnes a ﬁeld of inquiry by tracing its research edge and which
thereby returns cultural analysis to an engagement with philosophical
realism at the level of embodiment. For the phenomenotechnical
mode assumes philosophical realism. Because human embodiment is
relatively reliable, embodied practice is not merely a frame for the
circulation of signs but also an empirical investigation into repeatable
41. Rheinberger,
Epistemology of the
Concrete, p. 30.
42. Bachelard in
Rheinberger,
Epistemology of the
Concrete, p. 31;
emphasis in original.
43. I have borrowed the
term phenomenotech-
nique fromRheinberger
because it seems to
point to exactly this type
of analysis, but other
concepts might be
employed to similar
ends. Thomas Csordas
has attempted to com-
bine Pierre Bourdieu’s
understanding of habi-
tus with Merleau-
Ponty’s phenomenol-
ogy through the con-
cept of ‘somatic modes
of attention’ – see
‘Somatic Modes of
Attention’, Cultural
Anthropology, 8.2
(1993), 135–56 (p.
138); and for an appli-
cation to embodied
technique, see Jen Tarr,
‘Habit and Conscious
Control: Ethnography
and Embodiment in the
Alexander Technique’,
Ethnography, 9.4
(2008), 477–97. More
recently, the term soma-
technics has been coined
to ‘highlight the inex-
tricability of soma and
techné, of “the body”
(as a culturally intelligi-
ble construct) and the
techniques (dispositifs
and “hard technolo-
gies”) in and through
which corporealities are
formed and trans-
formed’ – see
Somatechnics: Queering
the Technologisation of
Bodies, ed. by Nikki
Sullivan and Samantha
Murray (Surrey:
Ashgate, 2009), p. 3. I
ﬁnd somatechnics a
compelling term,
although I consider it a
problem that the
volume draws no dis-
tinction between tech-
nique and technology in
its approach to
‘technics’.
44. It is useful to note that
Gaston Bachelard
encountered the same
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pathways of technique.47 This brings us to a further distinction of the
phenomenotechnical mode: the way in which it both does and does
not privilege the voice of the practitioner. In contrast to third-person
approaches, the phenomenotechnical mode does accord a certain kind
of privilege to the practitioner. Far from being suspect because of
their intimacy with the practice, the practitioner is understood as
having special access to the technical and epistemic objects in play
by virtue of this closeness. However, this privilege is eminently con-
testable. Unlike the phenomenological mode, the phenomenotechni-
cal mode does not prioritize experience, perception, or ‘what it is
like’ to be or do something – phenomena which, though they may be
shared to some degree through language, are not open to contesta-
tion or validation.
Because they cannot be contested, phenomenological accounts
alone are insufﬁcient to delineate a shared ﬁeld of research. Varela
and Shear acknowledge this problem in their discussion of ﬁrst-person
methodologies. To resolve it, they suggest the need for a ‘second-
person’ position located between ﬁrst-person accounts of experience
and more distanced third-person accounts. For Varela and Shear, this
role is ﬁlled primarily by a teacher or mentor, as when ‘a researcher
seeks the mediation of a more experienced tutor to improve and
progress his [sic] skill as a scientist’.48 This works when we are deal-
ing with research in the weaker sense, where an individual researcher
makes discoveries relative to their own prior understanding. But if we
want to consider examples of research in the strong sense, where a
network of researchers works together over time to produce genu-
inely new knowledge, then we need to understand the second-person
position not as an individual teacher or mentor but as a community.
We might then say that the embodied researcher has the privilege of
speaking ﬁrst about what has happened, but this must be subjected to
analysis by others with related expertise. Hence the phenomenotech-
nical mode is one that accords contestable privilege to the practitioner.
The practitioner has (or ought to have) the ﬁrst opportunity to offer
an account of the practice, against which future accounts will be
contrasted. But the development of consensus about the structure
of a given practice will arise out of a process of contestation that
involves a community or network of practitioner-researchers working
in related areas. This is precisely the position from which a laboratory
scientist speaks: because of the scientist’s closeness to the experiment,
they are able to offer a ﬁrst interpretation of its results. While ques-
tions of bias and vested interest may be raised, there is no general
assumption that scientists are untrustworthy when analyzing their
own research, as one sometimes ﬁnds in discussions of embodied
research. On the other hand, a scientist’s announcement of research
results is never the ﬁnal word on ‘what happened’. Rather, it is the
start of a communal process that unfolds through shared documents
and discourse, as well as further experimentation, in which the ques-
tion of what happened is explicitly contested. It is time for us to
understand embodied research in these terms, not in order to claim
problem with scien-
tists, begging them ‘to
make available their
daily laboratory
experience, the daily
dramas of their daily
work, to the philoso-
phers of science, so
that they could reﬂect
properly about the
practice of contem-
porary science’. Hans-
Jörg Rheinberger,
‘Gaston Bachelard and
the Notion of
“Phenomenotechniq-
ue”’, Perspectives on
Science, 13.3 (2005),
313–28 (pp. 317–18);
see also Rheinberger,
Epistemology of the
Concrete, p. 28. ‘Tell
us what you think,’ he
implored, ‘not when
you quit the labora-
tory, but during the
hours when you leave
ordinary life behind
you and enter scientiﬁc
life’. Cited in
Rheinberger, ‘Gaston
Bachelard’, p. 218.
This is exactly what I
often ﬁnd myself say-
ing to skilled perfor-
mers undertaking
‘Practice as Research’
projects in academia:
before you attempt to
explain your practice
by reference to Michel
Foucault or Merleau-
Ponty, tell me what
you do in the studio.
Explicate the technical
skills that you teach
and describe the pro-
blems and questions
you face in practice.
Talk shop – for that is
where your primary
expertise lies.
45. ‘The bench work lan-
guage of the scientiﬁc
practitioner translates
with much more
appropriateness what
his work is actually
about than what a
particular philosophy
of science declares him
to be doing.’
Rheinberger, Toward
a History, p. 109.
46. Again, this is a pro-
blem for textbooks
and public dissemina-
tions in every ﬁeld, not
just embodied
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that embodied research is science (it is not), but in order to demon-
strate that it is in fact research.
When we speak of research in embodied practice and the embodied
arts, let us not fall into the illusion of a uniﬁed public sphere popu-
lated by atomized individuals. For between those scales intervene all
the institutions of disciplinarity, by which I mean not the ossiﬁed
gatekeepers of established power-knowledge but the communities,
networks, hubs, and nascent movements that organize themselves
around shared commitments to particular ﬁelds and pathways of
knowledge.49 This is the shifting ‘patchwork’ to which Rheinberger
refers. If we are going to speak only of individuals and society at large,
then we may as well not use the term research, for research has no
meaning without the differential incommensurability of its varied
ﬁelds. In the above account of song-action, I speak as an embodied
researcher, according myself a limited and contestable privilege in
relation to the technique that structures the documented practice. I
am the only one who was there during the whole research process. My
account, along with the cited video document, is now offered up to a
larger community for contestation or validation. But the community
to which I offer my account is not the ‘we’ of an imaginary public or
even the ‘we’ of those who happened to be in attendance at Judson
Church that night. It is a disciplinary we, grounded in shared knowl-
edge and expertise and with its own technical vocabulary, research
paradigms, and critical debates. It is precisely those practitioner-
researchers who have already been working for some time with phy-
sical actions, folk songs, extended voice technique, imaginative asso-
ciations, and body–voice integration who will produce the most
critical and incisive evaluations of my account. They alone can work
toward consensus regarding the epistemic objects I have proposed and
their potential uses.
Coda
The phrase ‘colors like knives’ comes from the original poem-text spoken
in Rite of the Butcher. In that poem, the phrase suggests the image of a
god who produces the world through a process of iterative differentiation,
through the redaction of colors out of an originary darkness (or light):
instead of a word or logos, the world begins from colour. In the present
analysis this phrase takes on a second meaning, linked to Karen Barad’s
peculiarly violent metaphor of the ‘agential cut’ as that which produces
the subject/object distinction in scientiﬁc laboratory research.50 If per-
formance technique can indeed produce new and speciﬁc epistemic
objects, as my interpretation of Rheinberger suggests, then my claim is
that the colour of the voice (for example) – its timbre or resonant quality
– operates in the epistemic space of embodied practice as a knife operates
in an anatomical dissection. The voice in this sense cuts not only into the
time and space of performance and into audience perception but also into
an epistemic ﬁeld constituted by the relative reliability of human embodi-
ment. This voice is a technical object, an experimental apparatus that
technique. ‘[A]s soon
as scientists go public,
they have a strong
tendency to leave all
that [technological
mediation] behind and
to convey a picture of
what they are doing as
if the instruments were
absent – or transpar-
ent.’ Rheinberger,
‘Forming and Being
Informed’, p. 204.
47. The question for realist
approaches is how to
distribute ontology:
given that there is
something real out
there, who gets to name
and analyze it? Whose
voice is to be privileged
when it comes to
articulating the real? As
Tom Sparrow suggests,
‘for much of the twenti-
eth century, it was phe-
nomenology that
promised to satisfy the
desire for realism among
continental thinkers,
but now it is clear that
phenomenology cannot
deliver realism as com-
monly understood’ –
The End of
Phenomenology:
Metaphysics and theNew
Realism (Edinburgh:
Edinburgh University
Press, 2014), p. xii.
However, there are
important differences
between the nuanced,
critically-oriented rea-
lism of social and his-
torical epistemologists
like Rheinberger and
Andrew Pickering and
the ‘speculative realism’
championed by
Sparrow. For a biting
critique of speculative
realism and its cousin
‘object-oriented ontol-
ogy’, see Nathan
Brown, ‘The Nadir of
OOO: From Graham
Harman’s Tool-Being to
TimothyMorton’s
Realist Magic: Objects,
Ontology, Causality’,
Parrhesia, 17 (2013),
62–71.
48. Varela and Shear, ‘First-
Person Methodologies’,
p. 9. Middleton and
Chamberlain also iden-
tify the second-person
position as an
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makes an agential cut as sharp as that of the biologist’s microscope or the
surgeon’s knife.
To create from nothing
New proportion, new dimension
Little houses, little people
Made of color
To give voice to a voiceless creation
I myself, individual, king,
Pulling, churning, dredging up
My insides to uncover
Those necessities that make possible
Such beginning
Colors like knives
I sing into being
Each new soul born naked and tiny
Swaddled in sand
Coming up in the containment of my song
And I am the godhead
Spewing ﬁre out of oriﬁces
All-singing, all-dancing heat of the world
Beastlike, terrible,
Thirty-ﬁngered vengeful god,
Capricious, jealous,
This my territory
These my peoples
I brook no desecration
Watch over my people
Father, mother, ancestor in one
It was not always so
experienced teacher in
their reading of Don
Hanlon Johnson’s
account of a workshop
with Charlotte Selver,
see Entering the Heart
of Experience, p. 98–99.
49. On the dual connota-
tions of disciplinarity,
see Spatz,What a Body
Can Do, pp. 50–56.
50. Karen Barad’sMeeting
the Universe Halfway:
Quantum Physics and
the Entanglement of
Matter and Meaning
(Durham, NC: Duke
University Press, 2007)
offers a reading of parti-
cle physics that closely
resembles
Rheinberger’s model of
the technical and the
epistemic. One impor-
tant difference is in how
they ﬁgure what I have
called the technical/
epistemic boundary or
‘research edge’, a post-
structuralist reworking
of the subject/object
relationship, which
Barad calls a ‘cut’ (e.g.
p. 55). When I concep-
tualize something like
‘wrestling the angel’ as
an element of song-
action, I could be said to
make a ‘cut’ in reality,
bestowing a name upon
a particular zone of my
own embodied techni-
que, naming a small
fraction of my habitus.
Every element of
embodied technique
would then derive from
a cut of this kind: a
roundhouse kick, a
mime walk, a pirouette,
a focused breath, etc.
But I am uneasy with
the narrowness of the
metaphor of cutting,
which in Barad derives
from practices of quan-
titative measurement
and which may be less
applicable to other kinds
of research. Some
research cuts; other
research traces, inter-
prets, gropes, dances,
charts, invites,
invokes. . .
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